Arguyo en este escrito que la epistemología del primer Schelling debe interpretarse como un antirrealismo trascendental. Reconstruyo aquí los argumentos en esas obras tempranas contra el realismo de los kantianos, que son desarrollos de premisas tomadas de la Crítica de la razón pura. Muestro coherentemente que el idealismo del primer Schelling resalta los límites trascendentales del discurso sobre objetos de conocimiento y que en realidad no incurre en dogmatismo, ni siquiera en el escrito Vom Ich.

Charles Taylor claims that not only Kant, but also successors of Kant such as Fichte and Hegel, advocate a primitive concept of action, namely, a basic, irreducible, indispensable concept allegedly essential to our self-understanding. This paper shows how philosophers like Robert Brandom agree with Taylor explicitly with regard to Hegel, and attribute to him transcendental non-metaphysical arguments in support of such a concept. It then proceeds to challenge this attribution, offering a brief presentation of an alternative non-transcendental metaphysical approach to (...) the Hegelian idea of giving actuality to a concept through a productive activity. (shrink)

Two concepts have polarized the philosophical debates on functions since the 1970s. One is Millikan's concept of ‘proper function’, meant to capture the aetiology of biological organs and artefacts. The other is Cummins's concept of ‘dispositional function’, designed to account for the real work that functional devices perform within a system. In this paper I locate Hegel's concept of biological function in the context of those debates. Admittedly, Hegel's concept is ‘etiological’, since in his account the existence of purposive organs (...) is explained by appeal to their purpose, yet, against Millikan's concept, Hegel's does not presuppose the phenomenon of natural selection nor derives the function of tokens from the function of types. So, my aim is, first, to present Hegel's approach to biological functions as one neither purely etiological nor purely dispositional. It will appear rather as an example of an organizational account, that attributes function according to present performances and emphasizes the role of functional parts in their self-production within the system they belong to. Finally, I briefly discuss how Hegel's concept performs against common objections to organizational accounts. (shrink)

El artículo explora las posibilidades de la teoría de Dennett sobre los sistemas físicos, funcionales e intencionales como punto de vista no reduccionista sobre las intenciones y las funciones. Dennett defiende que el aprecio de las ventajas predictivas y los compromisos ontológicos con ciertas pautas de las perspectivas funcional e intencional impide el reduccionismo y, por tanto, el fisicismo con respecto a funciones e intenciones. Se propone aquí que ese argumento se complemente con otro que muestre que las pautas del (...) comportamiento físico no son más objetivas que las demás. (shrink)

This paper examines a fundamental supposition of Kant’s moral philosophy, namely, that, without transcendental freedom, understood as the quality of the will by which it determines itself to act without being affected by sensible motives, we could not impute to any putative agent immoral acts. I argue theoretically against the logical sense of the supposition (showing its aporetic consequence), and I also demonstrate how superfluous it is from a practical point of view. Nevertheless I acknowledge to Kant, in spite of (...) some well known Nietzschean reasons, the merit of having grasped the insurmountable human attachment to the idea that we are arbitrary or transcendentally free beings. Finally, some instances of the echo of this merit in contemporary authors (Nagel, Strawson, Dennett) are reviewed. (shrink)

El artículo examina las posibilidades de una lectura naturalista del Sistema del idealismo trascendental (1800) de F. W. J. Schelling. Defiende que en el rechazo de un concepto absolutista de la voluntad y la teoría del surgimiento de la conciencia por medio del reconocimiento recíproco entre seres racionales se encuentra el principio (no desarrollado por Schelling) de una filosofía de la mente materialista no eliminativista plausible. Presento esas doctrinas en el contexto de las reacciones de F. H. Jacobi y J. (...) G. Fichte a las ambiguas consecuencias para el dogmatismo de la crítica kantiana del uso teórico de la razón. (shrink)

¿Cómo hay que entender la tesis de Hegel en la Lógica de que "la teleología es la verdad del mecanismo"? La afirmó contra Kant, desde luego; a saber, contra la posibilidad de que lo que parece teleológico sea sólo mecánico; pero no en el sentido de un compromiso dogmático con la realidad de fines naturales y tampoco en el de una refutación del mecanicismo como la que Fichte busca con su radicalización de la filosofía trascendental. Aquí se examina qué posibilidades (...) quedan abiertas cuando se cierran aquéllas. How should one understand the claim that "Teleology is the truth of Mechanism" advanced by Hegel in the Logic? It certainly opposes Kant's position in denying the possibility that what seems to be teleological is only mechanical, but not in the sense of a dogmatic commitment to the reality of natural ends or in the sense of a refutation of mechanicism as in Fichte's radicalization of transcendental philosophy. I examine in this paper which alternatives remain open once these are discarded. (shrink)

This book addresses a key issue in Hegel's philosophical legacy - his account of purposiveness and teleology - that has often been wrongly criticised and misunderstood. Its re-examination of the issue has implications for the whole of Hegel's philosophical legacy.

the article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.

Arguyo en este escrito que la epistemología del primer Schelling (al menos hasta 1797) debe interpretarse como un antirrealismo trascendental. Reconstruyo aquí los argumentos en esas obras tempranas contra el realismo de los kantianos, que son desarrollos de premisas tomadas de la Crítica de la razón pura. Muestro coherentemente que el idealismo del primer Schelling resalta los límites trascendentales del discurso sobre objetos de conocimiento y que en realidad no incurre en dogmatismo, ni siquiera en el escrito Vom Ich.

This article offers a constructive reading of the ‘Teleology’ chapter in Hegel'sScience of Logic. I argue that it contains an apparently conclusive case for the abstract concepts of means and end (in the sense of ‘purpose’), which has remained unrecognized in the literature. I then show some implications of the fact that the argument is entirely abstract in Hegel's system.

Symposium on Christopher Bennet's The Apology Ritual. A Philosophical Theory of Punishment [Cambridge University Press, 2008].

The purpose of this research paper is to identify which types of corporate philanthropy (CP): cause-related marketing (CRM) or sponsorship, create higher moralcapital under two conditions: proactive or reactive (following a scandal). Results showed that CP created higher moral capital for a proactive company than for a reactive company. Both CRM and sponsorship were perceived as more sincere in the proactive company than the reactive company. However, CRM was seen as self-serving in the reactive company, but not the proactive company. (...) The study demonstrated that companies need to take into account the different types of CP, as it has an effect on their moral capital. Socially proactive firms should engage in both CRM and sponsorship philanthropy, as both types can generate high moral capital, which creates better company reputation. However, CP may not be the most effective or appropriate strategy for creating moral capital following negative publicity. (shrink)

We investigate the relations among Brandom’s three dimensions of semantic inferential articulation, namely, incompatibility entailments, committive consequences, and permissive consequences. In his unpublished manuscript “Conceptual Content and Discursive Practice” Brandom argues that (1) incompatibility entailment implies committive consequence, and that (2) committive consequence in turn implies permissive consequence. We criticize this hierarchy both on internal and external grounds. Firstly, we prove that, using Brandom’s own definitions, the reverse of (1) also holds, and that the reverse of (2) may hold (but (...) the proof relies on substantive assumptions). This suggests that there are no three different notions of inference emerging from Brandom’s definitions, but at most two, and perhaps even just one. Secondly, this result puts into question the connections between the three inferential relations and the familiar notions of deduction and induction. (shrink)

La tesis principal que aquí se defiende es que, para Popper, la validez del conocimiento estuvo vinculada siempre a la dimensión pragmática del contexto de descubrimiento (e incluso dependía de ella). Constituye, pues, un error afirmar que, para él, 1) dicha validez estaba ligada a un "empirismo encubierto" (opuesto a la tesis sobre la carga teórica de toda observación), según lo ha planteado Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz, y que 2) en sus ideas, los factores pragmáticos carecían de importancia epistemológica, como (...) lo ha afirmado Ambrosio Velasco. Para justificar esta tesis, se examinan tres argumentos expuestos en The Logic of Scientific Discovery, enfatizando el que se refiere al carácter disposicional de los términos con los que, para Popper, se formulan los enunciados descriptivos. The main thesis I assert here is that for Popper validity of knowledge was always linked to (and even supported by) the pragmatic dimension of the context of discovery. I hold it's wrong to claim that for this author 1) validity of knowledge was linked to a "hidden empiricism" (opposed to the theory-laden character of observation), such as Ana Rosa Pérez Ransanz had propounded, and 2) pragmatic issues were epistemologically irrelevant in his philosophy, such as Ambrosio Velasco has argued. To justify my thesis I examine three arguments exposed in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, emphasizing especially Popper's argument about the dispositional character of the concepts in which descriptive statements are formulated. (shrink)

The processes that guide performance in Wason's selection task (WST) are still under debate. The matching bias effect in the negations paradigm and its elimination by explicit negations are central arguments against a substantial role for inferential processes. Two WST experiments were conducted in the negations paradigm to replicate the basic finding and to compare effects of implicit and explicit negations. Results revealed robust matching bias in implicit negations. In contrast to previous findings, matching bias was reduced but not eliminated (...) in conditions using explicit negations. Model-based analyses suggest that matching bias is due to a switch towards a negative test strategy caused by negations. (shrink)

1. Overconfidence is usually understood as being more confident than reality justifies (Harvey, 1997; Moore & Healy, 2008; Pompian, 2006), which leads individuals to overestimate their performance...

Orientation -- Religion as a fact -- Religious values -- Religion as a philosophical problem -- Conceptions of God -- Ways of knowing God -- The problem of belief in God -- The problem of good-and-evil -- Theistic absolutism and finitism -- Is God finite? -- The problem of human personality -- The problem of human purpose -- The problem of human immortality -- The problem of religious experience -- Internal criticisms of religion -- External criticism of religion.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Introduction Nonconsequentialist ethicists have noted that small harms, goods, or claims should not count against large claims. For example, given a choice between saving one life and a large group of people with minor headaches, we ought to save the one life, no matter how large the group is. This principle has been called limited aggregation. The principle of limited aggregation might have implications on public health policy, given that public health policy involves weighing the claims of individuals against one (...) another. Aims and Methods I aim to show that limited aggregation has implications for policies on e-cigarettes and alternative nicotine delivery systems. The methodology used in this study involves critical analysis of existing literature and pre-theoretical moral views. Results This study does not use empirical research. Conclusions In deciding to allow or encourage the use of e-cigarettes or alternative nicotine delivery systems, we sometimes must weigh benefits to each existing smoker affected by the policy against risks to each nonsmoker affected. I argue in this paper that when these risks, to each individual nonsmoker, are sufficiently small, we ought not to count them against more significant benefits to smokers. This applies even when the number of nonsmokers affected by a policy exceeds the number of smokers. Implications This paper implies that policymakers ought to be sensitive to the scale of benefits or risks introduced by a policy on individuals. If the negative side effects, on each affected individual, of a proposed policy are sufficiently small, they do not count against the beneficial goals of that policy. Depending on the expected effects of each given e-cigarette policy, this may give policymakers defeasible reasons to prioritize the needs of current smokers, who may each gain a lot from various means of smoking cessation, over nonsmokers, who each may only have a small chance of picking up smoking. (shrink)

In the first argument of Metaphysics Μ.2 against the Platonist introduction of separate mathematical objects, Aristotle purports to show that positing separate geometrical objects to explain geometrical facts generates an ‘absurd accumulation’ of geometrical objects. Interpretations of the argument have varied widely. I distinguish between two types of interpretation, corrective and non-corrective interpretations. Here I defend a new, and more systematic, non-corrective interpretation that takes the argument as a serious and very interesting challenge to the Platonist.

Neste trabalho analisamos a dinâmica da representação política não eleitoral de demandas indígenas em campanhas realizadas pela ONG Greenpeace Brasil da organização Mobilização Nacional Indígena (MNI). Nosso objetivo é identificar táticas de comunicação on-line a partir de conteúdos publicados pelas organizações em suas fanpages na rede social Facebook, entre março e agosto de 2016, período de intensificação de discussões sobre o licenciamento ambiental para a construção da hidrelétrica de São Luiz do Tapajós, que alagaria parte do território Munduruku, no Pará. (...) Identificamos as principais demandas defendidas por Greenpeace e MNI e características das ações considerando as categorias Information politics, Symbolic politics, Leverage politics e Accountability politics. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

En este artículo examino el tratamiento escéptico que Quine hace de la necesidad proposicional (de dicto) y no-proposicional (de re) a través de su teoría de tres grados de compromiso modal. Argumento que, a pesar de poseer diversos aspectos valiosos, sufre de varias limitaciones importantes que lo ..

The central theme of this impressively argued study is that the mental and physical are identical. Drawing heavily on recent scientific research into the mind-brain relationship, Dr Wilson argues that human mentality, rationality and purposefulness are phenomena which come within the compass of scientifically based explanation. The consequences of this thesis are enormous both in relation to the controversies about reasons and causes as explanations of human behaviour, and, more important, to the problems of free will, moral responsibility, penal philosophy, (...) ethics and the law. The book argues that free will is a misconceived idea and that our notions of moral responsibility need radical revision. The book is of considerable relevance not only to academic philosophy but also to scientists and jurisprudents interested in the implications of this study. Originally published in 1979. (shrink)